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In response to the increased threat of bioterrorism, a
task force on health security was established in the
European Commission. Task force members address a
broad range of issues related to preparedness for and
response to bioterrorist events and seek to bring about a
greater collaboration between the European Union mem-
ber states.
T
he deliberate release of anthrax in the United States of
America in September and October 2001 completely
changed the international perception of the risk of bioter-
rorism. Before that time, public health preparedness for
bioterrorism was not a political priority in the European
Union (EU) member states. Preparedness and response
plans and actions have since been given a higher priority
on EU member agendas. Bioterrorism also initiated a dis-
cussion on the need to improve preparedness through rein-
forcing existing public health structures that are in charge
of monitoring and controlling diseases.
On October 19, 2001, at the European Council in
Ghent, Belgium, the Council of Ministers of the EU and
the European Commission (EC) were asked by the heads
of state and government to prepare a program to improve
the cooperation between member states for the evaluation
of risks, alerts, and intervention, the storage of the neces-
sary means, and the collaboration in the field of research. 
In parallel with these developments at the European
level, many well-focused national activities were also car-
ried out. Countries reexamined their preparedness plans
and adapted them to the new threats, and legislation need-
ed to implement countermeasures was reviewed. The
national authorities also discussed the necessity of stock-
piling medicines and other medical supplies and most
upgraded their stocks of vaccines and antibiotics, especial-
ly smallpox vaccine. To improve the ability to recognize a
deliberate release, countries developed training programs
for different kinds of first responders.
On the initiative of the European Commissioner for
Health and Consumer Protection, the Health Security
Committee (HSC) was set up with representatives of the
ministries of health from each member state. Following a
proposal by the commission, the HSC agreed on December
17, 2001, on a program for cooperation on preparedness
and response to biologic and chemical agent attacks (or
Health Security Programme). The program comprises 25
actions grouped under four objectives (available from:
URL: http://europa.eu.int/comm/health/ph_threats/Bio-
terrorisme/bioterrorisme_en.htm). The overall goal is to
improve cooperation between the member states with the
aid of the commission and to facilitate collaboration
between the different national authorities involved in pub-
lic health preparedness for bioterrorism. During this
process, gaps in resources and methods are identified and
projects initiated to fill these gaps. As is standard practice
in many sectors of activity at EU level, existing examples
of preparedness in the member states are shared and can be
extended or adapted for use throughout the EU. Projects
and activities under the health security program are fund-
ed through existing funds, especially from the budget fore-
seen for the EU’s public health programs. Other funds such
as from the sixth framework program for research could
also be used for activities of relevance to the health secu-
rity program.
Since the beginning of May 2002, a 15-member strong
task force has been set up by the Directorate-General of
Health and Consumer Protection, comprising nine nation-
al experts seconded from different institutions in the EU
countries and six commission officials. The task force
includes representatives from the Robert Koch Institute
and the Paul Erhlich Institute (Germany), the Scientific
Institute of Public Health (Belgium), the Swedish Institute
for Infectious Diseases Control (SMI, Sweden), the
National Institute of Public Health and the Environment
(RIVM, Netherlands), the Hellenic Institute for Infectious
Disease Control (Greece), the Italian National Institute for
Health (Italy), as well as the Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital in
Paris (France). The task force’s main objective is to imple-
ment the health security program. To this end, members
have initiated further activities with key players in the
member states, some of which are described below.
One of the initial priority activities was the setting up of
a mechanism for rapid information exchange, consultation,
and coordination on all aspects dealing with bioterrorism.
All designated authorities of the EU member states have
now been connected through this network by means of
email, fax, and telephone. This tool makes it possible for
the task force and the nine member states to disseminate
information rapidly about suspected or confirmed inci-
dents and for national authorities to evaluate measures
planned with their implications for EU and for other mem-
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a week to facilitate the process. By May 2003, the system
had been used in two major EU-wide exercises and for
nine alerts about suspicious events communicated by the
member states. 
The early detection of a deliberate release or bioterror-
ist attack is an essential part of a program of preparedness.
One essential tool to make this possible will be the regular
surveillance activities already in place at national and
European level. Certain modifications to these systems,
such as the addition of certain diseases considered as hav-
ing a high potential for deliberate release, would have to be
done to make the systems better adapted to the new chal-
lenges of bioterrorism. To achieve this, the Community
Network on Communicable Diseases (the already existing
mechanism for EU collaboration in the areas of infectious
disease surveillance and control) extended its list of dis-
eases to be reported, to include additional threats such as
tularemia, anthrax, Q fever, and smallpox.
When the task force was established, several lists of
agents that could be involved in a biologic attack and con-
sidered of major bioterrorist threat had been established
and published. Against this background, an approach more
suitable to the demands for focused action in Europe was
developed though a matrix model designed to provide an
evaluation of the public health impact of any given agent
that could be used in bioterrorism. The matrix model may
also be used to identify areas where the public health
response needed strengthening for any given agent. This
means that for a given type of action a different set of
agents would emerge as deserving the highest attention.
The matrix model is currently being validated and has pro-
duced lists targeting specific areas of public health pre-
paredness, which are currently being reviewed by mem-
bers of the HSC. Using this model, identifying the public
health impact of new threats should be possible, such as
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) (once it has
been better characterized), multidrug-resistant tuberculo-
sis, or any other new or drastically changed disease-caus-
ing agent. 
The clinical management, including recognition, of
many of the diseases caused by the bioterrorist agents is
likely to be difficult, since they are, to a large extent,
unknown to the average clinician in Europe today. To pro-
vide clinicians with guidance and a source of generally
agreed-upon information, 10 different articles on 48 major
agents have been compiled (Bacillus anthracis (anthrax),
Yersinia pestis (plague), Francisella tularensis (tularemia),
smallpox and monkeypox viruses, Clostridium botulinum
(botulism), hemorrhagic fever viruses, encephalitis virus-
es, Coxiella burnetii (Q fever), Brucella species (brucel-
losis), Pseudomonas mallei (glanders), and Pseudomonas
pseudomallei). They have been sent for comments to
experts in all member states, have been adopted by HSC,
and will be made available to the European medical com-
munity. Their publication in a peer-reviewed medical jour-
nal is currently being considered. 
The laboratory capacity required to diagnose most of
the potentially toxic and infectious agents that might be
used in case of deliberate release is believed to exist with-
in the EU as a whole; however, no member state has the
complete spectrum of the diagnostic capabilities needed.
To improve the collective preparedness and to make more
efficient use of the available resources, the laboratory
capacities already in place are currently under review. As a
long-term goal these capabilities would be made available
to all member states of the EU. Additionally, more con-
crete collaboration between laboratories was initiated to
share techniques and participate in common quality assur-
ance schemes. Assisted by the task force, the P4 (U.S.
BSL-4) laboratories in the EU are currently forming a net-
work that will enhance their research activities through
common projects. They have been asked to develop proce-
dures to make P4 diagnostics available to all member
states and to handle, under high safety level requirements,
a substantial workload of analysis of environmental sam-
ples that might arise following a series of bioterrorist inci-
dents or threats. 
The European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal
Products  (EMEA) has already developed guidelines on the
use of authorized pharmaceuticals in case of deliberate
release of biologic and chemical agents (available from:
URL: http://www.emea.eu.int/index/indexh1.htm). This
includes guidelines for treatment and prophylaxis of the
agents on the so-called CDC A-list of the most important
threats as bioterrorist agents (1).
Stockpiling of medicines and vaccines (in particular,
smallpox vaccines) has been extensively discussed
between the different member states and the EC. Although
the member states initially looked into the possibility of an
EU-level vaccine stockpile, the member states opted to
establish national stockpiles sufficient for their projected
needs. 
Smallpox has become the model for much of the work
performed in the area of preparedness for bioterrorist inci-
dents. Vaccination is certainly an essential countermeasure
against possible smallpox threats, yet finding the right bal-
ance under different vaccine administration scenarios
between personal and societal cost-benefit ratios has
proved extremely difficult. To find optimal solutions, var-
ious attempts have been made to construct appropriate
mathematical models. Currently a group of European mod-
elers has been called by the task force to work together in
a network to develop models for EU purposes. In addition,
this group has been asked to give expert opinions on new
models published and to establish an infrastructure for
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should the need arise. 
Many member states have developed (or are in the
process of developing) specific preparedness plans for
smallpox. The task force has put in place a compilation and
review process, which includes the tabulation and compar-
ison of these plans to improve the understanding of how
and with what measures individual countries respond to
specific triggers and events and how components of their
plans, which are important for the whole EU, will interact.  
National authorities had already developed substantial
capacities to deal with chemical incidents. Much of the EU
work on chemical incidents has been done in close collab-
oration with other organizations like World Health
Organization (WHO) and Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons. A special working-group has been
formed under the auspices of HSC, and a project will be
initiated to take work on certain key aspects forward. 
In most areas investigated, existing European expertise
was identified that could ensure a high level of prepared-
ness against biologic or chemical agents. Considerable
effort is needed, however, to determine the exact kind of
expertise needed for specific cases and to identify special-
ists and develop the modalities required for effective shar-
ing of this expertise between countries. As a first step, a
plan for the development of a common directory of experts
has been developed, and countries have been asked to
make their national expertise available on behalf of the
EU. Further modalities will be developed when this first
step is implemented.
Better preparedness should also include improved coor-
dination between the commission and international organ-
izations working in this area such as the WHO and the par-
ties to the Global Health Security Action Initiative
(Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the
United States, the United Kingdom, and the European
Commission with WHO participating as a resource).
Multiple initiatives regarding coordination of actions in
this area are being pursued.
The EU program on health security is expected to be
concluded in November 2003. However, this deadline like-
ly does not provide enough time to complete the activities
anticipated in many of the areas included in the 25-point
action program. An extension of the task force’s duration
is therefore being sought. In the areas where activities have
taken place, a centrally launched initiative at EU level has
been found to be beneficial both for the member states and
for the EU as a whole. The work has opened new commu-
nication channels between member states, improving both
the understanding of the preparedness in other countries as
well as giving the possibility to learn from good practice
and tried solutions. The EC has also gained experience in
working with a group of experts who initiate activities with
more operational effectiveness than has been the case in
the past. This experience will be very useful in the contin-
ued discussion on the development of a European Centre
for Disease Prevention and Control since the task force can
be seen as a precursor to this centre, albeit in a narrow area
of activity. During the remaining 6 months and the period
of extension, if it is approved, the work in the area of
bioterrorism will continue to strengthen the capabilities at
EU level to respond to biologic and chemical threats. The
capabilities to manage diseases in emergency situations in
general will be improved, and knowledge gained will be
most useful for other areas of emergency preparedness. 
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al diseases as well as bioterrorism preparedness.
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